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Abstract (EN): This chapter considers whether the precautionary principle – a central
element of contemporary environmental law and policy – can be usefully applied in the
intellectual property context as a means through which the public domain can be protected.
Assuming the importance of the public domain, and arguing that expansions in intellectual
property protection risk harming the public domain, this chapter contends that it is
appropriate to apply the precautionary principle in the intellectual property context in order to
guard against harm to the public domain; suggests several ways in which a precautionary
principle (or a precautionary approach) could be applied in the intellectual property context;
and considers one possible instantiation of the precautionary principle in the context of
intellectual property reform, namely in the form of a Public Domain Impact Assessment
(PDIA). Modeled on the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, the PDIA is envisioned as
a process through which proposals for intellectual property reform, prior to their enactment,
are evaluated by an independent review panel in order to determine their potential impact on
the public domain.
Résumé (FR): Dans ce chapitre, on examine dans quelle mesure le principe de précaution –
un élément central du droit et des politiques en environnement – peut être appliqué à bon
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escient dans le contexte de la propriété intellectuelle, en tant qu’outil servant à protéger le
domaine public. En tenant compte de l’importance du domaine public, et en affirmant que
l’extension de la protection de la propriété intellectuelle risque de porter préjudice au
domaine public, on soutient dans ce chapitre qu’il convient d’appliquer le principe
de précaution au contexte de la propriété intellectuelle dans le but d’éviter de nuire au
domaine public. L’auteur propose différentes manières d’appliquer le principe de précaution
(ou, à tout le moins, une approche de précaution) au contexte de la propriété intellectuelle; il
examine en outre une éventuelle mise en application du principe de précaution dans le
contexte de la réforme de la propriété intellectuelle, notamment sous la forme d’un Processus
d’évaluation de l’impact sur le domaine public (PÉIDP). Façonné suivant le modèle de la Loi
canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale, le PÉIDP est conçu comme un processus au
moyen duquel des propositions de réforme de la propriété intellectuelle seraient, avant leur
adoption, évaluées par un comité d'examen indépendant, chargé de se prononcer sur leur
incidence éventuelle sur le domaine public.
***
A. Intellectual Property Law, the Environmental Movement, and the Public Domain
In 1997, James Boyle, seeking to protect the public domain through the construction of
a politics of intellectual property, drew inspiration from the environmental movement.2
Pointing to the ways in which the environmental movement “piggybacked on existing
sources of conservationist sentiment, including the aesthetic and recreational values held by
hikers, campers, and birdwatchers” in order to “buil[d] coalitions between those who might
be affected by environmental changes”;3 Boyle argued that “[i]n one very real sense, the
environmental movement invented the environment so that farmers, consumers, hunters and

2

James Boyle, “A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?” (1997) 47 Duke LJ

87.
3

Ibid at 112.

3

birdwatchers could all discover themselves as environmentalists.”4 Boyle concluded that
“[p]erhaps we need to invent the public domain in order to call into being the coalition that
might protect it.”5
Just as Boyle drew inspiration from the environmental movement in order to “invent”
the public domain, techniques developed by the environmental movement or drawn from
environmental law and policy can be employed to help safeguard it. Molly Shaffer Van
Houweling states that since Boyle issued his call to action to “invent” the public domain,
“advocates for the value of open access to cultural raw materials [have borrowed] not just the
politics of the environmental movement, but also specific techniques that environmentalists
have used to protect important natural resources.”6 Van Houweling herself, for instance, has
discussed the ways in which “lessons that emerge from the conservation easement movement
. . . might inform copyright policy.”7
In this chapter, I will consider whether the precautionary principle – a central element
of contemporary environmental law and policy – can be usefully applied in the intellectual
property context as a means through which the public domain can be protected. This chapter
is part of a broader project in which, building on the work of Boyle, Van Houweling, and
others,8 I examine whether and to what extent concepts, tools, and techniques developed by
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the environmental movement or drawn from environmental law or policy can assist in
protecting the public domain.
Boyle defines the public domain as “material that is not covered by intellectual
property rights.”9 For the purposes of this chapter, I will use Boyle’s definition as a starting
point and expand upon it by suggesting that the public domain encompasses material that has
never been covered by intellectual property rights; material formerly covered by intellectual
property rights in which the grant of rights has expired (or has been declared invalid); uses of
material that are deemed not to be covered by intellectual property rights through the
application of defences/exceptions to intellectual property infringement (or that can be
considered to be user’s rights10); and uses of material that are not covered by intellectual
property rights by virtue of the application, by intellectual property owners, of flexible
licences through which certain rights are disclaimed.11
This chapter assumes the importance of the public domain. It accepts that the public
domain fosters creativity; facilitates innovation; enables self-expression; and that it is
instrumental in both the development of individual identity and in the construction of
communities.12 If these assumptions are correct, and the public domain is important, then it is
necessary to develop mechanisms through which it can be protected. Among other potential
threats, expansions in intellectual property protection (for instance by increasing the term of
copyright) risk harming the public domain by placing more material under the control of
rights-holders for longer periods of time.13

9
James Boyle, The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2008) at 38.
10
CCH Canadian Ltd. v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13.
11
Creative Commons licences, for instance. See Ronan Deazley, Rethinking Copyright: History, Theory,
Language (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2006) at 107 for a similar definition.
12
For an in depth discussion of the importance of the public domain, see, for example Craig, above note
5; and Boyle, above note 9.
13
It can also be argued that the intellectual property regime does not sufficiently consider the impact of
the exercise of rights on the public domain.
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Although recognizing that the risk of harm to the public domain that may flow from the
expansion of intellectual property rights differs from the risk of harm to the environment that
may flow from persons engaging in polluting or environmentally destructive activities, I
suggest that it is appropriate to apply the precautionary principle in the intellectual property
context. Both the environment and the public domain provide significant benefits to society.
These benefits may be overlooked in favour of other benefits that might flow from
development or enhanced intellectual property protection, respectively (such as economic
benefits for certain industries or political benefits). As well, in the case of both the
environment and the public domain, the impact of harm caused by polluting/environmentally
destructive activities and intellectual property expansion, respectively, is both uncertain and
difficult to establish.
There are several ways through which a precautionary principle or a precautionary
approach14 could be implemented in the intellectual property context. For example, a
precautionary principle/approach could be applied in determining whether intellectual
property rights such as patents and trade-marks ought to be granted, as an interpretive tool in
determining whether rights have been infringed, or at the point at which proposals are
submitted to ministers or Cabinet for approval.
In this chapter, I will discuss another way in which the precautionary principle could be
applied in the intellectual property context. Specifically, I will suggest that the precautionary
principle could be applied at the point at which proposals for reform of intellectual property
legislation are formally introduced as part of the legislative process. In the final section of
this chapter, I will propose the creation of a Public Domain Impact Assessment (PDIA), a
process through which proposals for intellectual property reform, prior to their enactment, are
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evaluated by an independent review panel in order to determine their potential impact on the
public domain.
B. Overview of the Precautionary Principle
The roots of the precautionary principle can be traced back to Swedish and German
domestic environmental law and policy. Joakim Zander states that “something resembling a
modern precautionary principle guiding all environmental and health regulation has been in
effect” in Sweden “[s]ince the late 1960s.”15 At approximately the same time as the concept
underlying the precautionary principle emerged in Sweden, the principle of Vorsorgeprinzip
began to appear in German environmental policy.16 Mike Feintuck, quoting Sonja BoehmerChristiansen, states that “[i]mplying both ‘foresight’ and ‘preparedness’, Vorsorge requires
that ‘if wisdom and science combine to warn that current actions may lead to harm,
government has the duty to change society by persuasion and regulation.’”17
In the 1980s, a precautionary approach began to be incorporated into international
environmental declarations. For example, in 1987, the Declaration of the Second
International North Sea Conference on the Protection of the North Sea (Second Declaration)
“gave explicit reference to a precautionary approach.”18 In 1992, the precautionary principle
was enshrined in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration).
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration states that “[i]n order to protect the environment, the
precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.
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Joakim Zander, The Application of the Precautionary Principle in Practice: Comparative Dimensions
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 152.
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Mike Feintuck, “Precautionary Maybe, But What’s the Principle? The Precautionary Principle, the
Regulation of Risk, and the Public Domain” (2005) 32 JL & Soc’y 371 at 374; Scott LaFranchi, “Surveying the
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Management Tool” (2005) 32 BC Envtl Aff L Rev 679 at 681; Ronnie Harding and Elizabeth Fisher,
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Elizabeth Fishers, eds (Sydney: The Federation Press, 1999) at 4.
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Feintuck, above note 16, quoting Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, “The Precautionary Principle in
Germany – enabling Government” in Interpreting the Precautionary Principle, Tim O’Riordan and James
Cameron, eds (London: Cameron May, 1994) at 39.
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LaFranchi, above note 16 at 682.
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Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation.”19
Nicolas de Sadeleer notes that since its incorporation in the Rio Declaration, the
precautionary principle has been included in the “majority of bilateral and multilateral
international treaties relating to environmental protection.”20 While the question of whether
the precautionary principle has reached the status of customary international law has not yet
been definitively resolved,21 Charmian Barton concludes that “its widespread use indicates
that it is recognized as a legitimate approach to environmental protection.”22
There is no single, universally accepted definition of the precautionary principle.
Rather, multiple versions of the precautionary principle have been proposed and implemented
in different contexts. One way of classifying differing conceptions of the precautionary
principle is by characterizing some as “weak” versions of the principle, and others as
“strong” versions of the principle.23 As Noah Sachs states, “[w]hereas weak versions of the
Precautionary Principle permit the government to regulate risks under conditions of scientific
uncertainty, the Strong Precautionary Principle suggests that some precautionary regulation
should be a default response to serious risks under conditions of scientific uncertainty.”24

19
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, “Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development”, (1992) 31 ILM 874 at 879 (Principle 15).
20
Nicolas de Sadeleer, “The Effect of Uncertainty on the Threshold Levels to which the Precautionary
Principle Appears to be Subject” in Environmental Risk, Volume II, John S Applegate, ed (Dartmouth: Ashgate,
2004) 453 at 457.
21
Harding and Fisher, above note 16 at 5. In “The Precautionary Approach and the International Control
of Toxic Chemicals: Beacon of Hope, Sea of Confusion and Dilution” (2011) 33 Hous J Int’l L 605 at 629,
David L VanderZwaag notes that the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea, in an Advisory Opinion, stated that “the Rio Declaration has initiated a trend towards making the
precautionary approach part of customary international law” (Responsibilities and Obligations of States
Sponsoring Persons and Entities with respect to Activities in the Area (2011), Advisory Opinion, Seabed
Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea No 135).
22
Charmian Barton, “The Status of the Precautionary Principle in Australia: Its Emergence in Legislation
and as a Common Law Doctrine” (1998) 22 Harv Envtl L Rev 509 at 5187.
23
See Julian Morris, “Defining the Precautionary Principle”, in Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary
Principle 1, Julian Morris ed. (Woburn: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2000) at 1-19.
24
Noah M Sachs, “Rescuing the Strong Precautionary Principle from its Critics” (2011) 2011 U Ill L Rev
1285 at 1295.
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Sachs notes that “strong” versions of the precautionary principle also “explicitly [place] the
burden on the private proponent of the risk-creating activity to . . . [prove] that risks are
acceptable or reasonable”.25 Both “weak” and “strong” versions of the precautionary
principle, though they differ in certain ways, also share some common characteristics.
Recognizing that not all harms can be remedied after the fact, both versions emphasize
anticipating future harm.26 Both versions also emphasize that, in the face of uncertainty with
respect to harm, preventative measures should be taken.27
Despite its widespread use and application,28 the precautionary principle has been
subject to criticism from numerous commentators.29 Cass Sunstein, one of the most
prominent critics of the precautionary principle, while suggesting that “weak” versions of the
precautionary principle are “sensible,”30 “unobjectionable and important,”31 has advocated
for the rejection of “strong” versions of the precautionary principle. Stating that “every step,
including inaction, creates a risk,”32 Sunstein argues that “strong” versions of the
precautionary principle, by requiring parties to “[a]void steps that will create a risk of harm,”
have the effect of “forbidding inaction, stringent regulation, and everything in between.”33
Rather than assisting policy-makers in determining which route to pursue when faced with
the risk of harm, Sunstein states that strong versions of the precautionary principle “[offer] no
guidance” 34 and “[lead] in no direction at all.” 35

25

Ibid.
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
In addition to the field of environmental law and policy, the precautionary principle is also influential
in the field of health policy and practice.
29
See, for instance, Morris, above note 23; Frank B Cross, “Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary
Principle” (1996) 53 Wash & Lee L Rev 851.
30
Cass R Sunstein, “Beyond the Precautionary Principle” (2003) 151 U Pa L Rev 1003 at 1018.
31
Ibidat 1016.
32
Ibid at 1003.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid at 1020.
35
Ibid at 1003.
26
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Notwithstanding this criticism, some commentators, such as Sachs, argue that the
precautionary principle, in both its “weak” and “strong” formulations, remains a valuable tool
in seeking to assess and regulate risk in environmental and other contexts.36
C. Applying the Precautionary Principle in the Intellectual Property Context
In considering the application of the precautionary principle in the intellectual
property context, three preliminary questions must be addressed. First, is it appropriate to
apply the precautionary principle in the intellectual property context in order to guard against
harm to the public domain? Second, in what types of situations (if any) might the
precautionary principle be usefully applied in the intellectual property context? Third, how
might the precautionary principle be instantiated in the intellectual property context?
1) Is it Appropriate to Apply the Precautionary Principle in Order to Guard Against
Harm to the Public Domain?
As noted above, the precautionary principle emphasizes both anticipating future harm
(recognizing that not all harm can be remedied ex post facto),37 and taking preventative
measures in the face of uncertainty with respect to harm.38 As is the case with harm to the
environment, not all harms done to the public domain can be remedied ex post facto. For
instance, it has been argued that copyright laws may prevent individuals and institutions from
taking steps to preserve, for the benefit of society, existing expression in which they do not
hold copyright, such as by transferring old movies from film prints to digital files.39 The loss
of this expression through the passage of time, or by an unfortunate event such as a fire or a
flood, is irreversible and would have a negative impact on the public domain.40
36
Sachs, above note 24. See also LaFranchi, above note 16; Feintuck, above note 16; David Dana, “The
Contextual Rationality of the Precautionary Principle” (2009) 35 Queen’s LJ 67.
37
Sachs, above note 24 at 1295.
38
Ibid.
39
For instance, see Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, “Can Our Culture Be Saved? The Future of Digital
Archiving” (2007) 91 Minn L Rev 989.
40
This material, once lost, would be unavailable for use in ways that would be encompassed by the fair
use or fair dealing defences, and would not be available for unrestricted use upon expiry of the copyright in the
work.
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However, it cannot be assumed that the risk of harm to the public domain caused by
expanding intellectual property protection is the same as the risk of harm to the environment
caused by pollution or development. For instance, it is generally not argued that permitting
the release of a noxious substance into a waterway would benefit the environment. In
contrast, if we accept that intellectual property acts as an incentive for individuals to invest in
the creation and dissemination of expression, and that this incentive leads to the creation and
dissemination of expression that would not otherwise have been created or disseminated, then
increasing intellectual property protection may benefit the public domain, as opposed to
harming or impoverishing it. Expression, once created, immediately becomes part of the
public domain with respect to certain uses (fair dealing, for instance, in the context of
copyright), and, at a later date (after the expiration of the term of intellectual property
protection) for all other uses.
This is not to say that increasing intellectual property protection always (or ever) has
a net benefit on the public domain. While increasing intellectual property protection may act
as a further incentive for the creation of new expression, it also expands protection for
existing works. Thus, although expanding intellectual property protection, for instance by
increasing the term of copyright, may result in new works being created (making certain uses
of those works, such as fair dealing, immediately available as part of the public domain), it
also extends the period of time in which other uses of existing works will not be available as
part of the public domain.
As well, at a certain point, it can be assumed that the incentive function mentioned
above will cease to operate. At this point, expanding intellectual property protection will not
result in the creation and dissemination of any new works (works that would not have been
created or disseminated absent the expanded intellectual property protection). Said
differently, any expansion of intellectual property protection at or past this point will not
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provide any benefit to the public domain. Instead, it will only result in a contraction of the
public domain.
In applying the precautionary principle in the intellectual property context, the risks
posed to the public domain by expanding intellectual property protection must be balanced
with the benefits to the public domain that flow from expanding intellectual property
protection. This is a complicated calculus. However, the complicated nature of this calculus
should not bar the application of the precautionary principle in the intellectual property
context. Given the significant degree of uncertainty with respect to the impact of any
expansion of intellectual property rights on the public domain, and the possibility that
expansions in intellectual property might negatively impact the public domain, it can be
argued that if the public domain is seen as valuable and worth protecting (an assumption
upon which this chapter is built), preventative measures should be taken, and some version of
the precautionary principle ought to be applied.
The application of the precautionary principle in the intellectual property context can
also be justified by reference to the values that may be seen to underlie the precautionary
principle. Feintuck, for instance, has suggested that the precautionary principle has an
“essentially collective orientation”,41 and that it has “potential utility . . . . as an aspect and
reassertion of the public domain in the face of private economic interests.”42 In referencing
the public domain, Feintuck is referring broadly to the set of interests that belong collectively
to the public and not specifically to the public domain in the intellectual property context.
However, his statement is directly applicable in the intellectual property context. The
application of the precautionary principle, in the intellectual property context, may provide
some degree of protection for the set of collective interests and values that are furthered by

41
42

Feintuck, above note 16 at 398.
Ibid at 372.
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the existence of a robust public domain, in the face of private economic interests that may
attempt to encroach upon the public domain through intellectual property reform.
2) In What Types of Situations is it Appropriate to Apply the Precautionary Principle in
the Intellectual Property Context?
In considering the application of the precautionary principle in the intellectual
property context, a second question that must be addressed relates to the types of situations in
which the precautionary principle could be applied. In the environmental context, the
precautionary principle is applied in two types of situations. First, parties that wish to initiate
a project, engage in a behaviour, market a product, or use a substance that would otherwise
be prohibited by law are required, in certain circumstances, to apply to a regulatory body or
administrator for permission or for a licence. In determining whether to grant permission or a
licence, the regulatory body or administrator may be required to apply the precautionary
principle. Second, legislators may be required to consider the precautionary principle or to
adopt a precautionary approach when developing legislation.
In the intellectual property context, a precautionary principle/approach could be
applied in several ways. First, a precautionary approach could be applied by the relevant
granting bodies in determining whether a patent ought to be granted43 or whether a trademark ought to be registered. Second, the precautionary principle could be applied as an
interpretive tool in determining whether an intellectual property right has been infringed;44
whether a compulsory licence ought to be granted; or whether a defence to copyright
infringement ought to apply. Third, the precautionary principle could be applied at the point

43

In Europe, for instance, it can be argued that the “ordre public” or morality exclusion from patentability
enshrined in Article 53(a) of the EPC embodies a precautionary approach (Convention on the Grant of European
Patents (1973) 13 ILM 268 (European Patent Convention, as amended) (EPC)).
44
See, for instance, Timothy Endicott and Michael Spence, “Vagueness in the Scope of Copyright”
(2005) 121 Law Q Rev 657.
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at which proposals, the implementation of which may result in “important” effects on the
public domain, are submitted to a minister or Cabinet for approval.45
Fourth, and the subject of this chapter, another situation in which the precautionary
principle could be usefully applied is at the point at which proposals for intellectual property
reform are introduced. The application of the precautionary principle in the context of
intellectual property reform could require legislative bodies, when evaluating proposed
amendments to their intellectual property legislation or new intellectual property legislation,
to explicitly consider the impact of any such proposals on the public domain. In the following
section, I will consider one possible instantiation of the precautionary principle in the context
of intellectual property reform, namely in the form of a PDIA.
3) Applying the Precautionary Principle in the Context of Intellectual Property Reform:
Towards a Public Domain Impact Assessment
In considering how the precautionary principle might be applied in the context of
intellectual property reform, it is informative to look to existing works that have advocated
for an approach to intellectual property reform that could be characterized as “precautionary.”
One commentator, Thomas F Cotter, has explicitly suggested the application of the
precautionary principle in the context of copyright, stating that “policymakers would be wise
to incorporate something analogous to the Precautionary Principle, in order to minimize the
risk that aggressive copyright laws will decimate the cultural environment.”46
Cotter proposes several ways in which the application of the precautionary principle
could impact intellectual property reform. First, he suggests that the principle could “shift the
burden of justifying a proposed, but potentially harmful, rule to the affected industry.”47

45

This suggestion is modeled upon Strategic Environmental Assessment, “a tool that contributes to
informed decisions in support of sustainable development by incorporating environmental considerations into
the development of public policies and strategic decisions” (Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency,
online: www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=A4C57835-1, accessed September 17, 2012).
46
Thomas F Cotter, “Memes and Copyright”, (2005) 80 Tul L Rev 331 at 409.
47
Ibid at 404.
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Cotter states that the burden of proof could vary depending on factors such as the “magnitude
of the potential harm, its irreversibility, and the current state of scientific understanding of its
probability.”48 Second, Cotter suggests that “advocates of further copyright expansion” could
be required to demonstrate, through “some meaningful degree of proof that further
expansions are necessary to maintain incentives, and are likely to do no harm to the other
relevant goals of copyright.”49
Modifying the intellectual property reform process in such a manner as to require
evidence demonstrating the probability and seriousness of harm that may result to the public
domain from the adoption of proposed reforms, and demonstrating the consistency of
proposed reforms with the goals of intellectual property laws, could be of significant benefit
to the public domain. It is unclear, however, how the burden shift suggested by Cotter might
function should multiple industries propose the same reform or should reform be proposed by
parties other than industry. As well, questions could be raised as to whether it is in the public
interest to permit the industry proposing legislative reform to act as the party providing
evidence justifying this same reform. Cotter, acknowledging the potential for abuse inherent
in such an approach, notes that “affirmative findings [could be required] from the Copyright
Office or from Congress.”50

48

Ibid.
Ibid at 406.
50
Cotter, above note 46 at 406. Although Cotter’s paper is the only work to explicitly suggest the
application of the precautionary principle in the context of copyright, other works can be seen as supporting, in
principle, the call for the adoption of a precautionary approach in the intellectual property context. For instance,
see two “companion studies” prepared by Ian Kerr for the Copyright Policy Branch of the Department of
Canadian Heritage (Department of Canadian Heritage, “Technical Protection Measures: Part I – Trends in
Technical Protection Measures and Circumvention Technologies” by Ian Kerr (Ottawa: Minister of Public
Works and Government Services Canada, 2004), Department of Canadian Heritage, “Technical Protection
Measures: Part II – The Legal Protection of TPMs” by Ian Kerr (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and
Government Services Canada, 2004). Cotter, above note 46 also suggests that the proposal developed by Neil
Netanel in Neil Weinstock Netanel, “Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein”, (2001) 54 Stan L
Rev 1 at 47-54 can be characterized as an application of the precautionary principle in the context of copyright
law.
49
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Building on Cotter’s approach, I will conclude this chapter by proposing another
possible instantiation of the precautionary principle in the context of intellectual property
reform. Specifically, I will propose the creation of a PDIA. I envision the PDIA as a process
through which proposals for intellectual property reform, prior to their enactment, are
evaluated by an independent review panel in order to determine their potential impact on the
public domain. Given the space constraints of this edited text, I will not describe the PDIA in
exhaustive detail. Instead, I will introduce the framework of the PDIA, leaving the specific
details to be expanded upon in a future work.
My proposed PDIA is modeled on the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act
(CEAA).51 The CEAA can be seen as an instantiation of the precautionary principle in the
context of Canadian environmental law. As in the case of intellectual property, in which
private rights are balanced with the public interest, the CEAA attempts to achieve a balance
between economic development and environmental concerns.
I envision the PDIA process as an open, public process, conducted by an independent
review panel. Individuals, groups, and industry could have the opportunity to submit
documents and provide oral testimony to the review panel with respect to the impact of
certain legislative proposals on the public domain. Documents and testimony under
consideration by the panel could then be published online, giving the public the opportunity
to examine and comment on the submissions, the evidence contained in the submissions, and
the methodology employed by parties that have submitted evidence.52 Structuring the process

51

Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, SC 1992, c 37 (CEAA), as repealed by Jobs, Growth and
Long-Term Prosperity Act, SC 2012, c 19. On March 29, 2012, Bill C-38, An Act to Implement Certain
Provisions of the Budget Tabled in Parliament on March 29, 2012 and Other Measures, 1st Sess. 41st Parl, was
introduced by Canadian Finance Minister Jim Flaherty. Among other measures, Bill C-38 proposed to repeal the
CEAA and replace it with a new environmental assessment act (the CEAA 2012). Jobs, Growth and Long-Term
Prosperity Act, SC 2012, c 19 received Royal Assent on June 29, 2012. Given uncertainty as to how the CEAA
2012 will operate in practice, I have chosen to base my approach, and the PDIA, on the CEAA.
52
In many ways, the PDIA process proposed in this chapter can be seen as an extension of current
legislative practices. For instance, in Canada, the public is already given the opportunity to comment on
proposed regulations. As well, in Canada, Parliamentary Committees considering legislative changes have the
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in such a manner, as opposed to relying on the party desiring a specific reform to provide
evidence justifying that reform, reduces the risk that the party desiring the specific legislative
reform might, as Cotter states, make “rosy predictions” or engage in “sleight-of-hand.”53
As is the case in the procedure set out under the CEAA, a number of mandatory
factors could be considered under the PDIA process, including:54
-

The projected impact of the proposed legislative reform on the public domain, including the
cumulative effects on the public domain that are likely to result from the proposed reform in
combination with existing legislation or other reforms that have been or will be undertaken.

-

The significance of this impact.

-

Comments from the public received during the course of the PDIA process.

-

Measures that might mitigate any adverse impacts of the proposed legislative reform on the
public domain.55

-

The purpose(s) of the legislative reform.

-

Alternative means of achieving this/these purpose(s) and the effects of such alternative means
on the public domain.

-

Evidence demonstrating that the proposed reform will (or will likely) achieve the desired
result.56

-

The impact that the proposed reform might have on groups.57

power to call experts to give evidence. The main difference between the PDIA and current legislative practices
would be the explicit focus of the PDIA on the potential impact of proposed legislative reforms on the public
domain.
53
Cotter, above note 46 at 406.
54
The following factors are drawn from and based on s 16(1) of the CEAA (CEAA, above note 51 at s
16(1)). Some of these factors are also suggested by Cotter, above note 46.
55
For instance, if a bill proposes to increase the period of copyright protection (an act that might have an
adverse impact on the public domain), additional defences or exceptions to copyright infringement could
mitigate any adverse impact.
56
A detailed analysis comparing and contrasting the application of the precautionary principle in the
intellectual property context with an evidence-based approach to law-making in the intellectual property context
is beyond the scope of this chapter, and will be the subject of another paper.
57
See Siva Vaidhyanathan, “The Anarchist in the Coffee House: A Brief Consideration of Local Culture,
The Free Culture Movement, and Prospects for a Global Public Sphere” (2007) 70 Law & Contemp Probs 205.
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While the factors noted above may already have been considered by bureaucrats and
politicians in the legislative drafting process,58 several advantages flow from formalizing
their consideration in a public manner through a PDIA. First, formalizing these factors and
mandating their review through a PDIA would ensure that each factor is explicitly
considered. Second, formalizing these factors and mandating their review through a PDIA
would increase openness and transparency within the legislative process, ensuring that the
factors are not simply analyzed by bureaucrats and politicians, but that they are seen, by the
general public, to have been analyzed. Third, formalizing these factors and mandating their
review through a PDIA would create a record of evidence that could be helpful for courts and
others seeking to interpret the legislation. This record could also be relied on in future years
in seeking to further reform, develop and shape intellectual property legislation and policy.
The consequences of determining, through the PDIA process, that proposed
legislative reforms might negatively impact the public domain could vary. One possible
approach could be for legislative bodies to bind themselves to the determination arrived at
through the PDIA process.59 This approach would represent the strongest instantiation of the
precautionary principle of the options outlined in this chapter. Under this approach, if the
PDIA process concludes that proposed intellectual property reforms might negatively impact
the public domain beyond a certain threshold (for instance, might have a “severe impact” on
the public domain), the legislative body would not be permitted to pass the legislation as
proposed.
Several criticisms of this approach could be raised. First, this approach could raise
democratic legitimacy concerns, as elected officials would be prevented from passing
legislation by a decision made by an unelected body of individuals (the PDIA review panel).

58

For instance, these factors may have been considered in a Regulatory Impact Analysis or a Regulatory
Impact Assessment.
59
This suggestion goes beyond what is prescribed in the CEAA, which provides the administration with
discretionary power to approve or not approve a project (see CEAA, above note 51, s 37).
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Second, adopting an approach that limits the ability of the legislative body to expand
intellectual property protection (if one assumes that expanding intellectual property
protection, at least past a certain point, negatively impacts the public domain) could create
the risk of harm in other areas, for instance with respect to foreign relations, international
trade, or the development of a nation’s cultural industries.
A second option that could be pursued in the event that the PDIA process concludes
that proposed legislative reforms might negatively impact the public domain beyond a certain
threshold could be to require the legislative body to take steps to mitigate the potential impact
of their proposals on the public domain. One step that could be taken is the creation of a body
that has the authority to take certain steps to mitigate harm that might be done to the public
domain should certain legislative reforms be enacted into law. This body could be given the
authority to create or recommend the creation of additional defences to copyright
infringement or to grant specific licences in order to partially (or completely) offset potential
harm to the public domain that might result from the enactment of the proposed intellectual
property reforms.60 Depending on how this mechanism is structured, democratic legitimacy
concerns could arise under this approach, as well.
A third option that could be pursued in the event that the PDIA process concludes that
proposed legislative reforms might negatively impact the public domain beyond a certain
threshold could be to permit the legislative body to pass the legislation as proposed, without
mandating any of the mechanisms outlined above. The legislative body could choose,
however, to implement any or all of the proposed mechanisms.

60

A model for such a mechanism can be found in 17 USC §1201(a)(1), which permits the Librarian of
Congress to determine “whether there are any classes of works that will be subject to exemptions from the
statute’s prohibition against circumvention of technology that effectively controls access to a copyrighted work”
(James H Billington, “Statement of the Librarian of Congress Relating to Section 1201 Rulemaking” (2010) US
Copyright Office, online: www.copyright.gov/1201/2010/Librarian-of-Congress-1201-Statement.html, accessed
September 22, 2012).

19

Although representing the weakest instantiation of the precautionary principle of all
of the options described in this chapter, numerous positive benefits, for the public domain,
would flow from the adoption of this approach. As is the case with the first two approaches,
the public, open, and transparent nature of the PDIA process would bring attention to the
risks to the public domain that might flow from the proposed intellectual property reforms;
individuals would have the opportunity to give testimony to an independent body about the
potential impact of the proposed reforms on the public domain, creating opportunities for
discussion and deliberation; any evidence presented in support of the proposed reforms could
be scrutinized; and lack of evidence provided to support any proposed reforms could be
noted.
Additionally, while under this approach the legislative body would not be compelled
to make changes to proposed legislative reforms as a result of the conclusion reached in the
PDIA process, legislators could be held to account in future elections for their decision to
pass the proposed intellectual property reforms notwithstanding the determination of the
PDIA process. Given these benefits, and the democratic legitimacy concerns mentioned
above with respect to the first two options, I would advocate for legislative bodies to consider
adopting this approach.61
In a manner similar to the way in which the implementation of the procedure outlined
in the CEAA guards against certain risks to the environment, the introduction of a PDIA into
the context of intellectual property reform would guard against certain risks to the public
domain. First, the introduction of a PDIA into the context of intellectual property reform
would provide some measure of assurance that legislative reform is “considered in a careful
and precautionary manner” with respect to the possible impact of legislative proposals on the

61
Before any approach is formally adopted, however, more detailed consideration of the constitutional
impediments to introducing a mandatory review of proposed legislation would be required.
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public domain.62 Second, introducing a PDIA would also “ensure that there are opportunities
for timely and meaningful public participation” on the issue of the potential impact of
intellectual property reform on the public domain.63 Third, incorporating a PDIA into the
legislative reform process in the area of intellectual property law might also “encourage”
parties to “take actions” that maintain a healthy public domain.64 Lastly, the mere presence of
the PDIA (and the public nature of its process) would serve as an affirmation of the
importance of the public domain, of the public values that underpin intellectual property, and
of the interconnectedness of private rights and the public interest.
Certain issues with respect to the PDIA would need to be addressed prior to its
implementation in any jurisdiction. For instance, the legislative body would need to
determine what types of consequences it wishes to have flow from a determination that the
proposed reforms negatively impact the public domain beyond the applicable threshold; what
ought this threshold to be; what limitations, if any, would need to be placed on the ability of
individuals, groups, or industry to give testimony or to comment on testimony in order to
ensure that the legislation can be considered within a reasonable time frame; who ought to
bear the cost for a PDIA; how ought the selection process for the independent review panel
proceed; whether (and/or to what extent) the PDIA would be conducted a second (or third)
time in the event that amendments to the proposed legislation are introduced; and what steps
could be taken if the PDIA process determines that there is no way to mitigate potential harm
to the public domain that might arise from proposed legislative reforms.
D. Conclusion
This chapter assumes the importance of the public domain. If this assumption is
correct, then it is necessary to explore different ways through which the public domain can be

62
63
64

CEAA, above note 51 at s 4(1)(a).
Ibid at s 4(1)(d).
Ibid at s 4(1)(b).
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protected. Concepts, tools, and techniques developed by the environmental movement and
drawn from environmental law and policy-making can play (and have played) an important
role in this project. In this chapter, I have considered whether one concept originally
developed in the context of environmental law – namely the precautionary principle – might
usefully be applied in the intellectual property context in order to protect the public domain.
I have suggested both that it is appropriate to apply a precautionary principle in the
intellectual property context; and that the precautionary principle could be applied in the
intellectual property context at the point at which proposals to reform intellectual property
legislation are introduced. In the final section of this chapter, I have drawn upon the CEAA to
suggest one possible instantiation of the precautionary principle in the context of intellectual
property reform. Specifically, I have proposed the creation of a PDIA: a process through
which proposals for intellectual property reform, prior to their enactment, are evaluated by an
independent review panel in order to determine their potential impact on the public domain.
The adoption of such an approach by legislative bodies would signal broad
acceptance of the idea that the public domain is important; that it is valuable; and that, like
the environment, action must be taken to ensure that it is protected. While the adoption of a
PDIA may not prevent legislative bodies from enacting legislation that negatively impacts the
public domain, it would, at a minimum, help to clearly articulate what is at stake (and what
might be lost) should proposed reforms to intellectual property legislation be enacted into
law.

